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IMPLICATIONS OF INDONESIA'S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
POLICY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Hong Lan Oei*
A Major Reversal in Foreign Investment Policy
The widely publicized and by now well known fundamental and 
drastic changes in political outlook and economic policy since 
the abortive coup d'etat of October 1965 have, in some cases 
slowly, and in others, more rapidly, pervaded all sectors of 
economic and political life in Indonesia. It should therefore 
come as no surprise that the attitude towards foreign invest­
ment has also undergone a thorough-going change. Nevertheless, 
the rapidity and the extent of the reversal in foreign invest­
ment policy have perplexed even the most seasoned observers of 
Indonesian affairs. It should be noted that the new foreign 
investment law, Law No. 1 of January 1, 1967, was promulgated 
at a time when the so-called "dualism" in state leadership still 
existed, with Sukarno still formally president but with General 
Suharto already holding full executive powers, and when, in the 
words of the Chairman of the Indonesian Technical Committee on 
Capital Investment, "the effective Government under Suharto 
was trying to reverse major national policies against the 
desperate opposition of President Sukarno. . . ."* 1
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the 
new law was in many respects still vague and even ambiguous. 
Subsequent developments, however, have shown the seriousness 
of the intentions of the government in implementing it through 
additional laws and regulations.
The purpose of this paper is, first of all, to follow 
developments in government policy regarding foreign investment 
in the light of the pronounced objective of promoting economic 
development.
* The author is a member of the United Nations ECAFE Secretariat 
in Bangkok. However, the views and opinions expressed in the 
paper, which was prepared by him in his personal capacity, 
are not necessarily those of ECAFE.
1. Professor M. Sadli, in a presentation before the meeting of 
the Pacific Indonesia Business Association, as quoted in: 
Stanford Research International, Report No. 3, 1967, The 
Djakarta Report, Menlo Park, California, 1967, p. 9. For an 
official English translation of Law No. 1/1967, See: Indonesia,
Department of Information, Investment: The New Procedures of
Foreign Capital Investment (Djakarta, 1968).
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Secondly, the paper will attempt to assess the implications 
of the new policy for future economic development. While the 
new attitude towards foreign investment should be welcomed, in 
view of Indonesia’s shortage of capital and of technical and 
managerial skills, and in view of persistent balance of payments 
difficulties, it remains to be seen whether a too liberal atti­
tude towards the inflow of such capital will be in line with 
general economic development policy in Indonesia. Logging con­
cessions without regard to conservation policies, for instance, 
may lead Indonesia in the future to imitate the unfortunate 
example of excessive forest denudation set by the Philippines. 
The same can be said of fishery concessions. In the field of 
mining and estate agriculture, concessions without stipulating 
the desirability of local processing of the commodities pro­
duced and exported may lead to a perpetuation of Indonesia’s 
position as a supplier of raw materials at a time when world 
prices for raw materials are generally believed to be undergo­
ing a long-term downward trend. As pointed out by Professor 
Sadli, ”. . .  candidates for investment in Indonesia should 
realize that they will work and live in a country that has 
been emancipated from a colonial past and is striving to build 
up a national economy that must not be made an adjunct of 
western business empires. Economic nationalism is an important 
feature in our revolution and is here to stay.”2
On the other hand, a continued moratorium on mineral ex­
ploration and neglect of fishery and forest resources will 
lead Indonesia nowhere, socialism and anticolonialism not­
withstanding .
In view of these problems, a general review of actual 
developments in the implementation of foreign investment policy 
will be given, including an enumeration of the problems en­
countered by foreign investors and the likelihood of the actual 
inflow of foreign capital as distinct from the maximal amount 
granted by the permits. It should be noted that both of 
Indonesia’s closest neighbors, the Philippines and Malaysia, 
which have similar economies to Indonesia’s but which have a 
longer record of favorable attitudes towards foreign invest­
ment, have recently promulgated new investment incentive acts 
and are actively engaging in foreign investment promotion.3
Indonesia, on the other hand, has the advantage of having 
been virtually closed to new foreign investment projects for
2. Djakarta Report, p. 9.
3. Malaysia, The Investment Incentives Act, 1968, Kuala Lumpur, 
February 29, 1968. Philippxnes, Investment Incentive Act, 
1967, Republic Act No. 5186, Manila, September 16, 196^.
Also Basic Rules and Regulations, issued by the newly estab­
lished Board of Investment.
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over twenty years. Indonesia's 115 million people offer a huge 
potential market for many import substituting industries #? 
its untapped forest resources and unexplored but potentially 
rich mineral wealth may form the basis of many new export 
industries.
Attitude Towards Foreign Investment: 1949-1966
The attitude towards foreign investment during the period 
1949 to 1966 was never consistent. A state of persistent un­
certainty prevailed as the continuing conflict between the 
recognized need for additional capital for development pur­
poses to supplement domestic resources and economic national­
ism and resentments of foreign dominance of the economy in­
herited from the colonial era remained unresolved.
The "liberal" period between December 1949 and August 
1959 was a period in which frequent changes occurred in 
government policy due to a rapid turnover of coalition 
cabinets. During this period there were no less than eight 
such cabinets, some of them remaining in power for only a 
few months.
Politically, this period could be further subdivided 
into two: the period of the first four cabinets, from
December 1949 to July 1953, when the government attitude was 
generally believed to be more "pro-western," and the period 
of the next four cabinets, when, in the words of John Sutter, 
the outlook was dominated by "less tolerant ultra-nationalist 
and socialist politicians."^
The economic equivalent of this political conflict, 
while not always neatly coinciding with the political sub­
periods , was also felt throughout the period, causing many 
issues, especially with regard to foreign investment policy, 
to remain unresolved.
Thus in 1951, a resolution was passed in Parliament in 
which a State Commission on Mining Affairs was appointed to 
report on the desirable operation of all mining rights in 
Indonesia. Pending the report of the Commission, the govern­
ment was asked to postpone the granting of all concessions 4
4. John Sutter, Indonesianisasi, Politics in a Changing Economy, 
1940-55 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1959) . Also: Herbert
Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey (ed.), 
Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963), pp. 314ff. For a com­
prehensive discussion of the implications for economic policy 
see Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy Making in Indonesia, 
1950-57," Economic Development and Cultural Change, X, No. 2, 
Part I (January 1962).
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and exploitation permits and the extension of expired permits.
As it turned out, the Commission took eight years to deliberate 
and report and only in 1960 were laws regulating petroleum and 
other mineral explorations passed.5 The adverse effects of the 
prolonged moratorium between 1939 and 1963 on mineral and 
petroleum production and exports can only be roughly estimated.
Another example of the detrimental effect of the continu­
ous conflict between opposing views can be seen in the repeated 
postponement of the enactment of the first foreign investment 
bill originally drafted in 1953. The draft bill was ultimately 
approved by the cabinet in June 1956, but it took another two 
years before it was passed by Parliament (with a few amendments), 
only to be repealed by President Sukarno in mid-1959.6
The first foreign investment law was very general in na­
ture . It recognized the needs for foreign capital and granted 
assurances of non-nationalization for periods of 20 or 30 years 
depending on the nature of the enterprise. The provisions for 
transfer of profits and for lightening the burden of taxation 
were kept vague while nationwide transportation services and 
other fields of endeavor remained closed to foreign enterprise. 
The law had little consequence in attracting foreign invest­
ment as the general political climate became increasingly hos­
tile towards foreign capital.
The period of "Guided Democracy” and "Guided Economy1," for 
mally launched by Sukarno in July 1959y was marked by relatively 
more stability in the government. Parliament was reorganized 
and reduced to a "rubber stamp" body. The cabinet was led by 
the president himself and was no longer responsible to parlia­
ment. In the field of foreign investment, more radical atti­
tudes were evinced but the basic dilemma continued to plague 
government policy. This was demonstrated by the eight-year 
plan for 1961-69 adopted in 1960. Muhammad Yamin, Chairman of 
the National Planning Council, argued against contracting 
foreign loans on the ground that debt service repayment was 
getting burdensome. He opted in favor of financing the plan 
through the "development of natural resources" and implicitly, 
in favor of foreign investment rather than loans. But since 
the expropriation of all Dutch interests in December 1957, 
there was little predisposition to accept a policy in favor of 
direct foreign investment. Therefore the government cautiously 
developed a new plan of cooperation with foreign enterprises 
which later became known as production-sharing contracts.
5. Law No. 37/Prp. 1960 on Mining and Law No. 44/Prp. 1960
on Oil and Natural Gas.
6. English version of the Foreign Investment Law in American- 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Information Bulletin, No. 551, 
October 23, 1958.
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The petroleum and gas exploration law of 1960 stipulated 
that all mineral oil and gas constituted national wealth and 
that such mining could only be undertaken by the state. If 
necessary, the government could appoint another party as a 
contractor on the basis of production-sharing. On August 3,
1962, President Sukarno issued an official statement on produc­
tion-sharing, defining such contracts as foreign credits provided 
for a specific project, the credit to be repaid within a stipu­
lated time with an agreed percentage of the product of the 
project.7
This compromise concept, which finally brought together the 
opposing views on foreign investment, came under attack from the 
Communist Party which became increasingly powerful after 1959.
The late D. N. Aidit, chairman of the party, stated that all 
forms of foreign investment constituted imperialism and that 
new forms of such investment, whether in the form of joint ven­
tures, production-sharing, or contractor deals were just subtle 
forms of continuing domination by foreign economic enterprise.
He likened the new forms of foreign investment to sharecropping 
practices in agriculture.8
Under these circumstances, the new production-sharing policy 
was not able to attract really sizeable amounts of foreign capi­
tal. Expropriation of foreign property came in two waves. The 
first, as noted earlier, was directed against all Dutch 
enterprises in December 1957, in response to the defeat of a 
pro-Indonesian motion in the U.N. General Assembly on the 
problem of West Irian. The second wave came in 1963-65 
a_gainst British, American, Belgian and Malaysian interests 
in conformity with Indonesia’s confrontation policy against 
Malaysia.
Thus, two political issues, the West Irian issue and the 
Malaysia issue, resulted in the virtual elimination of foreign 
direct investment in Indonesia except in the petroleum industry 
and in a few production-sharing contracts in other fields. 
Agitation continued against these last vestiges of foreign 
capital up to the time of the coup d’etat in October 1965.
The New Foreign Investment Policy
The significance of the new investment policy lies not 
merely in the passage of a new foreign investment law, but also,
7. Statement on Production Sharing Arrangements issued by the 
President m  August 1962.
8. D. N. Aidit, Sosialisme Indonesia dan Sjarat-Sjarat 
Pelaksanaann j a (Djakarta: TiAliarcham," 19 62) , pp . 9 7-98 .
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and perhaps more importantly, in the follow-up measures and the 
actual implementation of the law as well as in the general 
economic climate of the country.
During 1967 and 1968, Investment Guarantees Treaties were 
concluded between the government of Indonesia and the govern­
ments of the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands and West 
Germany. Since the signing of the treaty with the United States, 
55 American companies have submitted applications to A.I.D. for 
possible investments of over $600 million, of which $400 million 
is in the field of mining, including petroleum. Of course, the 
$600 million should only be considered potential investment.9
In February 1968, Indonesia decided to enter into the Con­
vention on the Settlement of International Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States. This convention was 
sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and opened for signature by member governments on 
March 18, 1965. It enables the foreign investor to enter into 
negotiations with the host country without recourse to his own 
government's sponsorship and should provide him with an addi­
tional guarantee.10
Like the other economic measures introduced in October 
1966, the Foreign Investment Law was also based on Decision 
No. 23 of the Provisional People's Congress, MPES. 11
9. Under the United States guarantee program, investors may 
choose the particular risks against which they wish to be 
guaranteed, expropriation, non-convertibility of currency 
or war, and pay premiums accordingly. High priority in­
vestments can also apply for "extended" risk insurance 
covering all types of risks. See, United Nations, Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries (New York: United
Nations, 1968) , p . 25.
10. Although more than fifty countries have signed this conven­
tion, Latin American countries are conspicuously absent from 
the list, as they reject any discrimination in favor of 
aliens as against host country's nationals and in their 
traditional Calvo clause require that foreign investors sub­
ject themselves to the jurisdiction of local tribunals. See, 
United Nations, The Status of Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, Document No. A/AC.97/5, Chapter I.
11. Article 62 of "Decree No. XXIII concerning Renewal of Policy 
as to the Basis of the Economy, Finance and Development," 
Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Madjelis 
Permus]awaratan Rakjat Sementara 20th June to 5th July 
1966, English Edition (Djakarta: Department of Information, 
1966 ) .
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However, the law, which was approved by Parliament and 
promulgated as Law No. I of 1967 should be considered rather 
differently in purpose and intent from the October 1966 mea­
sures. These measures essentially constituted a crash pro­
gram to deal with the galloping inflation and to rescue the 
economy from the accelerating downward trend of the previous 
years.
By its nature, the new foreign investment policy could 
not be made part of such a program as no foreign private capital 
can be forced to enter and help rescue a deteriorating economy.
No matter how liberal a policy of encouraging foreign invest­
ment, the ultimate decision lies with the foreign investor and 
it is always easier to ban or expropriate capital than to per­
suade capital to enter a country. Thus, the new law should be 
seen more in its long term perspective. It was officially stated 
that 1967 and 1968 would be devoted to stabilization and re­
habilitation measures and that economic development would only 
begin to be pursued in earnest with the launching of the Five 
Year Economic Development Plan in 1969. The contribution of 
foreign investment would be more apparent in the period of the 
five year plan.
The 1967 foreign investment law is much more liberal than 
that of 1958. However, as high priority was given to the early 
passage of the bill, the law shows signs of haste and is still 
vague and ambiguous in certain respects. The government stated 
that executive policy would remove some of the uncertainties 
insofar as they stemmed from the imperfections of the law, as 
it preferred to wait for experience rather than rush to make 
detailed rules that could be unfortunate if proven too restric­
tive .
A series of supplementary regulations and laws were issued 
after January 1967. Among the more important ones was the 
regulation concerning the possibility of converting overdue 
foreign private claims into "foreign investment1 rupiahs.12 
Under this scheme, the many private creditors who have overdue 
claims inherited from pre-1965 times and are not guaranteed by 
foreign governments may convert their claims into special rupiahs, 
called Debt Investment Conversion Scheme or DICS rupiahs, which 
may be used for investing in Indonesia and can claim the same 
advantages as foreign investment. Such DICS rupiahs may also 
be sold to third parties wanting rupiahs for local working 
capital, and finally DICS may be converted into foreign exchange 
for the purpose of importing equipment and raw materials needed
12. Instruksi Presidium Kabinet No. 28/EK/IN/5/1967 issued on 
May 10, 1967, and Basic Regulations Governing Debt Invest­
ment Conversion Scheme Rupiahs IDICS) issued by the 
Central Bank on September 6, 1967.
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for the setting up or running of an enterprise.
Another important set of measures dealt with the return of 
foreign-owned enterprises expropriated under the previous regime, 
with the exception of Dutch enterprises taken over in 1957.
The Dutch have agreed to accept compensation payments instead.
In addition, laws granting incentives to returned enterprises 
similar to those for newly established foreign enterprises were 
promulgated. In some cases, the privileges granted are greater, 
such as the waiver of the $2.5 million minimum for additional 
capital brought in by returned enterprises for expansion or 
rehabilitation.13
Meanwhile, to comply with complaints voiced by domestic 
private capital interests, the long awaited Law to Promote 
Domestic Capital was passed on July 3, 1968 as Law No. 6, 1968. 
The long delay in the passage of the law was caused by the 
controversy surrounding so-called "foreign domestic capital."
It should be noted that the major part of private domestic 
enterprises and, therefore, of private domestic capital resources 
are in the hands of Chinese, many of whom, although having 
settled for generations in Indonesia, have opted for the citizen­
ship of China after independence and are therefore foreigners. 
Enterprises owned by them are technically "foreign" enterprises 
but are given the special name of "foreign domestic" enter­
prises.1^  This term originated in the previous era when such 
enterprises, though both private and foreign, were given a 
special place'because they were ostensibly "progressive" in 
that they did not affect the balance of payments by repatri­
ating capital or profits to China. The underlying reason, 
obviously, was political; the administration could hardly 
afford a deterioration in relations with China by nationalizing 
such private and "foreign" capital, especially between 1963- 
1965. Thus the late D. N. Aidit, who opposed all foreign 
capital, repeatedly defended the position of such "foreign 
domestic capital," which together with private national capital, 
he felt,should be given a prominent place in the struggle 
against imperialism. The same position was taken by Sukarno.15
13. Instruction No. IN/026 MEKKU/IV/1967 from the Presidium 
Minister for Economy and Finance, Djakarta, April 1, 1967.
The pertinent law preceding it is the Cabinet Presidium 
Instruction No. 09/U/IN/2/1967 Regarding Restoration of 
Foreign Enterprises, February 6"^ 1^67.
14. The distinction seems necessary as the source of such 
capital is always reinvested profits and never "inflow" 
from China.
15. See among others, D. N. Aidit, "Masalah Pengerahan Dana dan 
Tenaga ("Funds and Forces") Untuk Pembangunan," Ekonomi dan 
Masjarakat, Vol. VI, No. 1 (January-March 196 4) ; Sukarno* s 
speech of August 17 , 1959, entitled "The Rediscovery of Our 
Revolution," which was promulgated as the Political Manifesto.
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The new law on the promotion of domestic capital covers 
both national and foreign domestic capital. It is in many re­
spects more liberal than the foreign investment law and can be 
considered a supplement to it, as it removes certain uncertainties 
of the previous law. It should however be noted that in this 
law the word "foreign enterprise" essentially means foreign 
domestic enterprise as defined above.
Such foreign domestic firms, while they are to be given 
the same benefits as private national firms, are subject to many 
restrictions specifically mentioned in the law, especially re­
garding the length of their operation, which may be as short as 
ten years. In fact, the essential aim of Articles 6 and 7 of 
the law is eventually to end the dominant position of foreign 
domestic capital in the economy, while Article 23 stipulates 
that such capital cannot form a joint venture with a "genuine" 
foreign enterprise as defined by the 1967 foreign investment 
law. A subtle reversal has therefore been taking place in 
government policy regarding foreign "domestic" capital owned 
predominantly by resident but foreign Chinese.
It is interesting to note that $3,5 million owned by 
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent and now invested in Hong 
Kong is reportedly to be invested in five crumb-rubber pro­
cessing plants in Indonesia. This capital will probably be 
considered domestic but national capital as it is owned by 
Indonesian citizens.
Implementation of the New Policy
The Foreign Investment Picture in 1966
As Dutch investment substantially dominated the scene up 
to the expropriations of 1957, the wave of take-overs of Dutch 
enterprises in that year had significant consequences on the 
economy. All Dutch enterprises were turned into state enter­
prises and 1957 therefore saw the birth of an important public 
sector in the Indonesian economy.
It is difficult to estimate the extent of such investment* 
partly because of differences in the method of valuation and 
partly because the Dutch were very reluctant to disclose the 
actual amount. In 1958, the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns esti­
mated Dutch investments taken over in 1957 at 1,200 million 
dollars. In the final agreement reached between the Dutch and 
the Indonesian governments in 1967 on compensation payments 
for expropriated property, the total amount which Indonesia was 
to pay within a thirty year period was $157 million (six hundred 
million guilders).
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In a report prepared by an American firm for the Indonesian 
government, the total amount of foreign investment in Indonesia 
in 1952 was estimated at $2,240 million divided as follows:
Dutch 65.6%, American 15.6%, British 11.7%, French and Belgian 
4.7% with other foreign enterprises making up the rest.
The share of Dutch investments in the immediate pre-World 
War II period was also estimated at about two-thirds of total 
foreign capital. Total private investment by the Dutch at that 
time was estimated at $2,634 million, broken down as follows: 
sugar 15.2%, rubber 17.1%, other agriculture 13.3%, agricultural 
loan banks 10.4%, tin mining 0.4%, petroleum 19%, shipping 3.8%, 
railroads 5.7%, public utilities 3.8%, industry 1.9% and mis­
cellaneous 9.5% . 6
Capital of other countries was mainly invested in planta­
tions and petroleum mining. American capital was also invested 
in manufacturing, including a tire factory.
In the post-World War period, virtually no new private 
capital inflow from abroad took place with the exception of 
capital invested in the petroleum industry. While many com­
panies rehabilitated their former holdings, no new expansion 
programs took place. As continued uncertainty prevailed on the 
foreign investment scene and Dutch-Indonesian relations con­
tinued to deteriorate, many Dutch firms even attempted to re­
patriate accumulated profits and capital investments.
Generally, foreign investment was in the export-oriented 
industries providing raw materials for the industrial centers 
of the world. Little attention was paid to investing in in­
dustrial projects or even in the further processing of agri­
cultural and mineral products.
Ironically, the Sukarno sponsored production-sharing con­
tracts were, by their very nature, always export-oriented and 
would, if allowed to develop extensively, have perpetuated 
IndonesiaTs position as a raw materials exporter and an importer 
of all kinds of consumer goods. This is because production­
sharing contracts provided for repayments of credits from the 
products exported. Aside from the contracts in the petroleum 
industry, four projects of this nature had started exporting in 
1966, including a nickel contract with Japanese interests, a 
logging project, a palm-oil project and a tin-dredging project. 
Including other contracts signed but not in the exporting 
stage, total investments under production-sharing contracts, 16
16. A. S. Keller, "Netherlands Indies as a Paying Proposition," 
Far Eastern Survey (January 17, 1940). Chinese capital 
was included, probably accounting for the bulk of the 
miscellaneous category. Dutch governmental capital in tin, 
railroads and public utilities was substantial.
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outside petroleum, amounted to $47.8 million. Japan accounted 
for more than 50% of the total.17 18
These production-sharing contracts, together with oil com­
panies' investments to be discussed in the next section and the 
foreign "domestic" investment which is actually not foreign 
capital in the common definition of the word, constituted the 
only categories of foreign private capital still operating in 
the country by 1966.
The Problems Confronting the Foreign Investor
Judging from the quite substantial amounts of foreign capital 
for which investment permits were successfully applied during the 
years 1967 and 1968, the new investment policy of the government 
should be considered a promotional success. Apart from these 
efforts by the government, the many meetings sponsored by various 
foreign organizations on investment promotion in Indonesia have 
no doubt played a significant role in attracting prospective in­
vestors. Among the most important should be mentioned the 
Pacific Indonesia Business Association (P.I.B.A.) meeting spon­
sored by the Stanford Research Institute during August 2-5, 1967 
in Djakarta. This meeting, attended by 170 business executives 
from 14 nations plus 90 Indonesian business executives and many 
senior officials of the government, had as its basic purpose 
the assessment of economic development needs, programs and 
opportunities in Indonesia and the examination of the policies, 
conditions and projects under which both domestic and foreign 
private enterprise could participate in Indonesia's economic 
development.
As a follow-up measure to the meeting, the P.I.B.A. Investment 
Promotion Council (P.I.B.A. - I.P.C.) was established by the 
Indonesian participants. The new council cooperates with govern­
ment agencies in preparing feasibility studies, collecting 
pertinent information data and engaging in investment promotion 
in general. It has organized meetings in regional capitals of 
Indonesia like Surabaja and Makasar (and one to be held in a 
regional capital in Sumatra in early 1969) with the purpose of 
promoting investment in the regions outside Djakarta.19 As
17. Information provided by the Technical Committee on Capital 
Investment. For a comprehensive survey of production-sharing 
developments in Indonesia, see Joyce Gibson, "Production 
Sharing, I and II," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies (February and June 196$).
18. The Djakarta Report.
19. "From Sydney to Djakarta," Annual Report 1968 of the P.I.B.A.- 
I.P.C., mimeographed (Djakarta, January 1969).
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shown on Table 4, most manufacturing and other non-extractive 
investment projects are concentrated in Djakarta. An addition­
al result of these meetings has been recommendations put be­
fore the government, such as those adopted at the Makasar 
meeting, to review existing corporation taxation and labor 
laws .
Two other meetings were arranged by the New York-based 
Business International in Geneva and Djakarta, in November 
1967 and in September 1968 respectively. The Business and In­
dustrial Advisory Council of the O.E.C.D. and the Japanese 
"Keidanren," a non-profit organization representing 729 large 
Japanese enterprises also held meetings in Djakarta during the 
second half of 1968.
Apart from the obvious promotional benefits derived from 
them, these meetings also provided a useful forum for discuss­
ing the problems faced by foreign investors. As they were at­
tended by high-level government officials, these discussions may 
prove to have been quite effective. For instance, the Business 
International meeting in Djakarta discussed the frequent changes 
in government regulations, particularly in the field of foreign 
trade, making it impossible for investors, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, to make cost calculations. The conference 
noted that manufacturers not tied to raw material supplies in 
Indonesia might find other locations to set up their plants.
The conference also discussed the excessive administrative 
bureaucracy and the fact that procedures laid down by the cen­
tral government are frequently ignored by regional authorities, 
who in addition levy their own taxes, thereby increasing the 
unattractiveness of doing business in Indonesia. Moreover, 
the conference observed that hostile attitudes towards Chinese 
businessmen had resulted in a breakdown of marketing in some 
areas and that such discriminatory practices might in the 
future be turned to other non-Chinese foreigners.20
The discussion above brings us to the problem of the mo­
tivation of the foreign investor. It is a well-known fact that 
the private capital flow to developed countries is much larger 
than that flowing to developing countries.21
20. Editorial on Foreign Investment, Business News (Indonesian 
edition, Djakarta, September 20, 1 9 6 8 ) .  Also, Sanjoto, 
"Djakarta Forum," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 17, 
1968 ) .
21. For example, direct investment by United States business in
foreign countries at the beginning of 1965 was estimated at 
$ 4 4 . 3  billion, of which (in U.S.$ billion): 2 5 . 9  was in 
Canada and Europe, 8 . 9  in Latin America, 3.1 in Asia, 1.6 in 
Africa, 1 . 6  in Oceania, 1 . 4  in other Western Hemisphere and 
1 . 9  internationally. U.S. Department of Commerce, quoted 
in: United Nations, The Role of Private Enterprise in In­
vestment and Promotion of Exports m  Developing Countries 
(New York: United Nations, 1 9 6 8 ) ,  p p . 1 4 - 1 5 .
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The investors1 main consideration, when investing abroad, 
is to earn a reasonable profit which should be higher than he 
can earn at home to compensate for the extra trouble and risk 
of operating abroad. Under these circumstances, it is inter­
esting to examine the results of a world-wide survey on motiva­
tion conducted by Stanford Research International in 1961 in 
the light of the present Indonesian experience.22
The results of the survey indicate that the importance of 
factors in the considerations of foreign investors listed in 
order of rank is as follows:
1. Political stability.
2. Favorable government attitude towards private enterprise.
3. Economic stability.
4. Financial stability.
5. Favorable government attitude towards the profit motive.
6. Degree of corruption within the government.
No numerical values, of course, can be attached to these 
essentially qualitative factors and it is impossible to determine 
to what extent each factor will contribute to a particular in­
vestment decision. Thus, while under the Sukarno government 
political stability was probably more assured as no opposition 
was tolerated, other, lower ranking factors such as attitudes 
towards foreign investment, and more importantly, financial 
stability would have been rated very low as the rate of infla­
tion in 1965 and 1966 assumed runaway proportions.23
By contrast, the present preoccupation with democratic and 
constitutional principles has permitted vociferous opposition 
to government policies. On the other hand, the postponement 
of general elections reflects the present government’s belief 
that a return to the parliamentary procedures of 1950-1957 is 
not wanted at present as this would endanger the precarious 
political stability achieved.
However, all othe other factors have shown a favorable 
change in rating. Relative to 1965-1966, financial stability 
during 1967-1968 has significantly improved, as shown on Table 1, 
which shows that the rate of inflation and of depreciation of 
the rupiah, has been brought down considerably.
22. Harry J. Robison, The Motivation and Flow of Private Foreign 
Investment (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 
1961).
23. During 1965 and 1966, the consumer price index rose by 594 
and 635 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, the free market 
rate of the rupiah to the dollar rose from 7,125 rupiahs per 
dollar to 50,000 rupiahs in 1965, and from 50 new rupiahs
to 122 new rupiahs during 1966. (In January 1966, a revalua­
tion of the rupiah took place which converted 1,000 rupiahs 
into one new rupiah.)
Table .1 -pcr>
Rate of Inflation and of Rupiah Depreciation
End of month
Cost of living index Exchange rate movements
Base
-_§£EL
1966 
= 100
Monthly rate of 
inflation (%)
Rupiahs per 
U.S. dollar3
Monthly rate oJ 
change (%)
1967 1968 1967 19 6 8 1967 1968 1967 1968
January 145 395 9 40 131.0 297.5 7.4 2.6
February 174 432 20 9 133.0 293.0 1.5 -1.5
March 180 445 3 3 122.5 305.0 -7.9 4.1
April 181 419 0.5 -6 127.0 340.0 3.7 11.5
May 181 443 0 6 150.0 345.0 18.1 1.5
June 187 455 3 3 157.0 360.0 4.7 4.3
July 197 475 5 4 164.0 390.0 4.5 8.3
August 201 492 2 3 167.0 400.0 1.8 2.6
September 222 493 10 0.2 171.0 455.0 2.4 13.8
October 238 487 7 -1 173.0 485.0 1.2 6.6
November 287 505 20 4 220.0 430.0 27.2 -11.3
December 283 523 -1 4 290.0 420.0 31.8 -2.3
Annual rates: +112.8 + 85 +137.7 + 41.2
a. Free market exchange rate.
Source: Cost of living index: Biro Pusat Statistik; Exchange rate: Pengumuman Sub Dewan
Moneter, monthly government publication, various issues.
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Among the other factors, it is the sixth, or lowest ranking 
factor, the degree of corruption inherited from the previous 
hyperinflationary period, which has proved to be the most diffi­
cult to combat. True, corruption to a certain extent exists 
in most developing and in some developed countries and does not 
seem to be a major deterrent to the inflow of foreign capital, 
as evidenced by the low ranking the degree of corruption re­
ceived in Stanford’s survey. However, because of runaway infla­
tion, wages and salaries in Indonesia are extremely low, even by 
developing countries1 standards. This, coupled with an overgrown 
bureaucracy which plagues the present administration and the 
foreign investor alike, creates problems which may make this 
factor important enough to deter potential investors.
It is important to note, for instance, that only 10 per cent 
of Indonesia’s civil servants receive salaries above $5.00 
(five dollars) a month plus a rice allowance for an average of 
five children.2h As a result, most provincial officials all partici­
pate in business, whether officially or unofficially. These 
officials are often in a position to retard or facilitate an 
investment project, regardless of arrangements made and approval 
granted in the capital. As noted earlier, despite national 
exemption laws, local governors may assess local taxes of which 
the foreign investor is not aware when the permit to invest is 
granted.
Another problem is the time involved in the establishment 
of a corporation. A local enterprise desirous of joining a joint 
enterprise with a foreign company will have to liquidate and form 
a new company, a procedure which may take months to accomplish.24 5
Now that the government’s stabilization policies have shown, 
indications of success, a reorganization of the state apparatus 
coupled by significant salary increases will indirectly go a 
long way towards combatting corruption. But under present cir­
cumstances, where, as a result of prolonged and severe inflation, 
the widespread corruption has in most cases been caused by un­
realistically low salaries, repressive measures taken to combat 
corruption will only lead to endless charges and counter-charges, 
resulting in total confusion and demoralization.
Reorganization of the state apparatus is being implemented 
vigorously, by merging various government departments, by re­
allocation of civil servants to departments where there is more 
work to do, and by a massive lay-off of surplus civil servants.
It should be noted that the civil service has grown from 420,000
24. ’’The Deadwood Still Unlopped,” Economist (October 19 , 1968).
25. Moh. Sadli, ’’Laporan Perkembangan Penanaman Modal Asing 
Sampai Achir Djuli 1968,” mimeographed.
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in 1950 to 2.4 million at present. Many state enterprises such 
as Garuda Indonesian Airways and the State Shipping Line are 
laying off workers in large numbers. In the latter case , more 
than half of the total employees of the enterprise were recently 
discharged. It is to be hoped that the many new foreign in­
vestment projects will be able to absorb at least part of these 
workers, for they are swelling the large ranks of the unemployed.
Finally, the conference discussed the problem of high tax 
rates in Indonesia. While companies coming under the exemption 
law do not pay corporate tax during the grace period, cor­
porate tax rates, which are graduated from 20 to 60 per cent 
with the latter applicable to profits exceeding Rp. 7.5 million, 
were considered excessive. The high tax rates were considered 
necessary to insure enough revenues to the government in view 
of the high incidence of tax evasion. This in turn is a legacy 
of the past era of runaway inflation when only 250,000 people 
paid direct taxes out of a population of 115 million, the rest 
paying only indirect taxes and numerous semi-legal and illegal 
levies, which, however, were felt as quite substantial, as salaries 
of the government officials sank to incredibly low levels.
While efforts to increase the tax base to about 600,000 people 
in 1968 has met with some success, only a thorough overhaul of 
the tax collection machinery and improvement in civil servants’ 
salaries, resulting in an elimination of illegal levies, will con­
vince the citizenry of its obligation to pay taxes.
Sectoral Analysis of New Investment Projects
The highest authority for decisions on foreign investments 
is vested in an Advisory Body for Foreign Capital Investment or 
Investment Council chaired by the president himself and consist­
ing of cabinet ministers concerned with economics and finance.
In its day-to-day operations, this body is assisted by the 
Technical Committee on Capital Investment, popularly known as 
the Foreign Investment Board.26
Generally, an application for a permit to operate under 
the foreign investment law is forwarded to the government de­
partment concerned which then seeks the assistance of the 
Foreign Investment Board to prepare a recommendation to be sub­
mitted to the Investment Council for final approval. If this
26. Established on September 26, 1968 by_Presidential Decree No. 
286/1968, the Committee consists of two sections dealing 
with foreign and domestic investment respectively. It in­
corporates the Technical Team on Foreign Investment estab­
lished by the Cabinet Presidium Decision No. 17/EK/Kep 1/ 
1967 on January 19, 1967.
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is obtained, the minister concerned is authorized to execute 
the permit on behalf of the government.
Regarding the legal status of companies operating in 
Indonesia, the government requests such corporations to acknowl­
edge that its activities are governed by Indonesian laws and to 
appoint a registered agent and maintain a registered office in 
Indonesia. If operations in Indonesia are larger than the opera­
tions of the company in its country of origin, the company must 
establish a corporate body legalized under Indonesian law.27
Up to the end of September 1968, foreign investment applica­
tions approved according to the above procedure numbered 84, in­
volving a total of $342.13 million.28 This excludes foreign in­
vestment in banking, in petroleum and gas and the capital of 
returned foreign enterprises taken over under the previous 
regime. It does, however, include proposed new investments for 
rehabilitation or expansion by such returned enterprises as 
Unilever ($1.5 million) and Goodyear ($13 million). It is in­
teresting to note that the Dutch company Philips will undertake 
a joint venture involving 25 million Dutch guilders with the 
state enterprise Ralin which was originally established to take 
over the investments of Philips expropriated in 1957. Table 2 
gives the sectoral composition of foreign investment projects 
approved up to the end of September 1968,while Table 3 shows a 
breakdown of these projects by country of origin and type of 
project. Table 3 shows the United States leading the list in 
terms of number of projects, followed by the Netherlands and 
Japan. In terms of capital committed, the United States is 
followed by Canada and South Korea. It is interesting to note 
from the table that foreign investment applications have come 
from many developing as well as developed countries, reflecting 
the interest shown internationally in Indonesia’s new "open 
door" policy. The following pages will analyze the investment 
projects by sector.
Mining. The largest proportion of total investment committed 
goes to the mining sector, although at present only three com­
panies are involved: Freeport Sulphur of the United States, the
Billiton Maatschappij of the Netherlands and the International 
Nickel Company of Canada, exploring copper, tin and nickel de­
posits respectively. Total investments for explorations to be 
made by the three companies amount to only four million dollars, 
a fraction of the intended $158.5 million they will invest for 
further development if warranted by the exploration findings.
27. Investment, Government of Indonesia, Department of Informa- 
tion, 1968, p. 17.
28. Information supplied by the Technical Committee on Capital 
Investment. The figure for the end of 1968 was $365.12 
million.
Table 2 CnO
Foreign Investment Projects by Sector and Size of Capital 
(Up to the end of September 1968)
Projects smaller than Projects between US $1 Projects of US $2.5
Total____________  US $ 1 million_____  million and 2 million million or more
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
Average
capital
per
project 
in mn. $
Per
cent
of
total
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
Average
capital
per
project 
in mn,$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn.
$
Average
capital
per
project 
in mn.$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
Average
capital
per
project 
in mn . $
1. Mining 3 158.5 52.8 46.3 — — -- -- — — 3 158.5 52.8
2. Forestry 13 79.5 6.1 23.1 — — — 7 12.0 1.7 6 67.5 11.2
3. Manufac-
turing 43 66.7 1.6 19.5 22 7.6 0.3 16 23.0 1.4 5 36.2 7.2
4. Communica­
tions and
public works 11 16.9 1.5 5.0 6 0.7 0.1 1 2.0 1.0 4 14.2 3.6
5. Fisheries 7 11.5 1.6 3.4 — — — 5 6.5 1.3 2 b.O 2.5
6. Plantations 4 6.9 1.7 2.0 2 0.9 0.5 1 1.0 1.0 1 5.0 5.0
7. Commerce 3 2.1 0.7 0.6 2 1.0 0.5 1 1.1 1.1 — — —
Total 84 342.1 4.1 100. 32 10.17 0.3 31 45.6 1.5 21 286.4 13.6
Source: Technical Committee on Capital Investment: Sub Committee on Foreign Investment.
Table 3
Foreign Investment Projects by Sector and Country of Origin 
(Up to the end of September 1968)
Communica-
Manufac- tions and
Total____  turing Mining Forestry Fisheries public works Plantations Commerce
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No. of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
No.of 
pro­
jects
Capi­
tal 
in mn. 
$
1. U.S.A. 12 114.6 7 25,1 1 76.5 3 11.5 1 0.4 1 1.1
2. Canada 3 75.9 2 0.9 1 75.0
3. South Korea 1 48.5 1 48.5
4. Netherlands 12 19.4 6 10.8 1 7.0 1 1.5 — — 2 0.3 — — 2 1.0
5. Japan 10 17.2 3 4.2 — — 3 6.5 4 6.5
6. Philippines 4 12.5 3 11.0 1 1.5
7. Hong Kong 10 11.1 7 3.9 — — 1 6.0 — — 1 0.3 1 1.0 — —
8. Panama 1 9.0 1 9.0
8. West Germany 5 5.6 5 5.6
10. Belgium 3 5.5 2 0.6 1 5.0 — —
11. France 2 5.0 1 2.5 ~ — 1 2.5
Total 11 coun­
tries 63 324.3 33 60.1 3 158.5 10 76.3 5 8.0 7 14.6 3 6.4 3 2.1
Other countries3 21 17.8 10 6.6 — — 3 3.2 2 3.5 4 2.3, 1 0.5 — —
Total 84 342.1 43 66.7 3 158.5 13 79.5 7 11.5 11 16.9 * 6.9 3 2.1
a. Other countries include United Kingdom, Singapore, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, Norway, Malaysia and Kuwait 
Source: Technical Committee on Capital Investment: Sub Committee on Foreign Investment.
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Meanwhile, many other companies are negotiating concessions 
for the mining of nickel, bauxite, tin and other minerals in 
areas declared open for exploration. Among the most important 
are the negotiations going on with Alcoa of the United States, 
which has initialled an agreement with the government for the 
exploration and subsequent development of bauxite deposits in 
Indonesia. No specific area is mentioned in the agreement, but 
Alcoa will conduct a comprehensive survey involving $9.5 million 
and is expected to invest, if warranted by the survey, at least 
$100 million in the production of aluminum, including the con­
struction of an aluminum plant on Bangka island. Two other 
nickel projects, a Dutch-U.S.-Canadian and a Japanese consortium 
are vying for nickel contracts in the West Irian and Moluccas 
areas respectively. If the three nickel groups start producing, 
Indonesia1 s output is expected to be stepped up consider*- 
ably from present production of 170,602 tons in 1967, and 
170,386 tons in the first eight months of 1968. This will make 
nickel a major new source of export earnings for Indonesia.
Alcoa1s contract will also make Indonesia a significant producer 
of bauxite and aluminum, as at present it produces and exports 
only close to one million tons of unrefined bauxite a year.
On the other hand, large-scale stepping up of tin production 
may pose problems in the light of recent export quotas and 
restrictions and the threat of another steep decline in tin 
prices. Indonesia?s tin production has steadily declined, 
from 18.5 thousand tons in 1961 to a low of 12.8 thousand tons 
in 1966. January to August 1968 production totalled 10.7 
thousand tons. It is therefore very unfortunate that export 
quotas are being clamped on producers when Indonesia is on the 
verge of regaining her former position in the industry.
Forestry. The second largest sector is forestry, a rela- 
tively new industry in Indonesia. Conspicuous among the appli­
cants are those coming from other Asian countries, and one single 
project, that of the Korea Development Company, accounts for 
$48.5 million of the total, as shown in Table 3. It is signif­
icant that the Philippines and South Korea, themselves exporters 
of lumber and plywood, figure prominently among the investors.
This is not surprising in view of the declining supplies in 
the Philippines,which also account for the intensified efforts 
of Japanese plywood companies to obtain Indonesian supplies.
The total hardwood timber inventory of Indonesia is estimated 
at about 413 billion cubic feet, or more than 13 times that of 
the Philippines.29
About one-third of Indonesia's 120 million hectares of 
timberland is considered accessible, but logging activities at 
present cover only 5 million hectares. Although at present
29. Stanford Research Institute, Indonesia (Menlo Park, Calif.: 
Stanford Research Institute, 1967), p. 22.
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about 95 per cent of Indonesia1s consumption of paper* hardboard 
and plywood is imported, the immediate future will see, judging 
from foreign investment projects so far approved, more emphasis 
on logs and lumber exports rather than the establishment of 
forest-based industries, both for domestic consumption and for 
exports. By the end of 1968, an estimated 50 concessions in­
volving 7 million hectares are expected to be granted. Holders 
of concessions of over 40,000 hectares are required to establish, 
in stages, sawmills, veneer and plywood factories and finally 
pulp and paper factories.30 31
Manufacturing. Though manufacturing ranks third in total 
capital, it attracts the largest number of projects, reflecting 
a low average capital investment per project. 3 While most pro­
jects are in import-substituting industries, there are a few 
export-earning industries,such as the manufacture of hairwigs, 
instant coffee and crumb-rubber. The recently announced inten­
tion to ban all car imports except in knocked-down status will 
provide a stimulus to the establishment of car assembly factories. 
In view of the potential market of 115 million people, interest 
in the manufacturing industry so far has been rather disappoint­
ing and may await further promotional activities from the govern­
ment, as will be discussed later.
Communications and Public Works. This category includes a 
satellite communications project of I.T.T. and several aviation 
companiesT plans to operate internal services in Indonesia. While 
the introduction of new services to supplement the often quite 
inefficient domestic services of the Garuda in the past should 
be welcomed, an indiscriminate granting of licenses to numerous 
small companies may again result in inefficient competition and 
operating losses. According to a Communications Department re­
port, fifteen private airline companies have been granted 
licenses in Indonesia, of which six have started operation .
Plantations. This sector, together with mining 
traditionally the most important foreign investment sector , 
has so far attracted little attention from potential investors.
In view of declingin raw material prices in general/ and 
rubber prices in particular, this should be expected, The 
same holds true for Malaysia. Although Malaysia still expects 
to expand rubber and palm-oil acreage and production consider­
ably, such expansion will take place in government-sponsored 
land-clearance projects rather than in private estates1 acreage.
30. Mohamad Sadli, Laporan Penanaman Modal Asing Sampai Achir 
Djuli 1968, mimeographed.
31. In Tables 2, 3 and 4, the manufacturing sector incorporates 
pharmaceutical, which in the original tables supplied by 
the Technical Committee constitutes a separate category.
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Meanwhile, several companies have shown interest in banana and 
maize plantations, both new fields for Indonesia but both 
rapidly expanding commodities in international trade.
Other Sectors. Among the other sectors, projects in fish­
er ies’~wrrr~be~Tmportant in their contribution to export earn­
ings. Shrimps, a rapidly growing international trade commodity, 
attract the most attention, as American and Japanese companies 
have obtained concessions. Tourism has so far not attracted 
serious investors. Judging from the potential in this field 
and the shortage of hotel and other facilities in Djakarta and 
in other Indonesian towns, tourism projects will most probably 
become more important in the future.
Banking. As stated earlier, foreign investment in banking 
is regulated under separate laws, and permits are granted under 
a different system. Up to the end of November 1968, eleven 
foreign banks, from the U.S.A., Japan, Thailand and other 
countries, have been granted approval, eight of which have started 
operations. Five more banks have submitted their applications.
All banks must bring in a minimum of $1 million in order to 
qualify.
Petroleum and Gas. Petroleum will continue to be one of 
Indonesia's major export earners in the future and prospects 
for considerably increasing exports from this source seem to 
be the brightest, considering both international demand trends 
and domestic developments in production. Despite the moratorium 
on exploration between 1939 and 1963 and despite the stipulation 
of the law of 1960 that oil and gas production should be vested 
in state enterprises which may appoint foreign companies as "con­
tractors," oil production continued to increase throughout the 
postwar period, and foreign enterprises continued to play a 
maj or role.
At present, the largest producer is Caltex, producing 
360,000 barrels per day or about 70 per cent of total produc­
tion in 1967. Caltex, together with Stanvac, operate under 
the 1963 agreement which essentially granted the three major 
operating companies32 3 a twenty year period of development of 
their old fields as well as thirty year contracts for new ex­
plorations in new areas in return for their being reduced to 
"contractors" and for surrendering their old concessionary 
rights.3 3
32. The third, Shell Company, sold its entire interests to the 
Indonesian government in January 1966, during the chaotic 
aftermath of the 1965 coup. Negotiations for the purchase 
of the other two companies were terminated following the 
major shift in Indonesia’s economic policy.
33. For details of the agreement, see Alex Hunter, "The Oil In­
dustry: The 1963 Agreements and After," Bulletin of Indo­
nesian Economic Studies (September 1965), pp. 16-34.
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Meanwhile, the reversal in government policy towards new 
foreign investment has attracted many new petroleum companies. 
Contracts for exploration and subsequent drilling, mostly in 
offshore areas, number twenty at the time of writing, mainly 
involving American and Japanese companies. These are pre­
dominantly small or medium-sized companies although three large 
international firms, Mobil of the U.S., C.F.P. of France and 
E.N.I. of Italy, have also shown interest. The predominance of 
small companies can be explained by the fact that foreign in­
vestment in oil is still governed by the stiff conditions of 
the 1960 Law No. 44 which provides essentially for production­
sharing "contracts." Under these contracts, the foreign com­
panies retain 40 per cent of crude production for exploration 
work and production costs. The remaining 60 per cent "profits" 
is divided into the ratio of 65:35 (in some cases 67^:32%) 
between the state oil enterprise Pertamina and the oil company, 
in favor of the former.
The results of all these new activities in oil will only 
be felt after 1970. However, production and exports from oil 
have already increased by large amounts in the last two years.
Net receipts from oil exports increased by 21 per cent in 1968, 
and are expected to increase by 33 per cent in the 1969-1970 
fiscal year.31* This increase has mainly been contributed by 
Caltex Oil Company which invested substantially in development 
drilling and construction of storage facilities which enabled 
it to step up production considerably. Caltex* new investments 
were prompted by a successful negotiation of a reduction in its 
crude oil prices with the Indonesian government.34 5
Problems of Location. Table 4 shows the distribution of 
investment projects by location. By far the largest number of 
projects are located in Djakarta, especially in manufacturing, 
with the rest located in Java outside Djakarta. Projects located 
on the other islands are in extractive industries or plantations, 
which of necessity must be located where they are. With regard 
to location, it is officially stated that the government decides 
the site on which the plant is located in conformity with the 
development plan. In the case of mining, fisheries and forestry 
projects, the government generally offers tracts or blocks for 
tender. Article 6 of the Directives on Determining Priorities 
grants additional exemption of taxes for one year to companies 
investing outside Java.
Foreign Investment and the Five Year Development Plan
At the end of 1968 the president officially declared the 
recently completed Five Year Plan to be the official basis for
34. Preliminary estimates from Bank Negara Indonesia Unit I.
35. Information provided by the Directorate-General of Oil and 
Gas .
Table 4 cn<T>
Foreign Investment Projects by Sector and Location 
(Up to the end of September 1968)
Djakarta
Java outside 
Djakarta Other islands Total
Total in 
Number mn. $
Total in 
Number mn. $ Number
Total in 
mn. $
Total in 
Number mn. $
1. Mining — — — — 3 158.5 3 158.5
2. Forestry — — — 13 79.5 13 79.5
3. Manufacturing 31 44.9 11 19.8 1 2.0 43 66.7
4. Communications 
and public 
works 10 16.4 _ _ 1 0.5 11 16.9
5. Fisheries — -- — — 7 11.5 7 11.5
6 . Plantations — — — — 4 6.9 4 6.9
7. Commerce 3 2.1 — -- — — 3 2.1
Total 44 63.4 11 19.8 29 258.9 84 342.1
Source: Technical Committee on Capital Investment: Sub Committee on Foreign Investment.
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government policy in the next five years.36
Foreign investment is to play a major role in the plan and 
in fact, for almost every industry, as indicated in the second 
volume of the plan, estimates of expected foreign investment 
inflows are included. Foreign investment is expected to con­
tribute mainly in three ways. It will contribute to capital 
formation and therefore to the financing of the plan. It 
will have favorable repercussions, whether directly or in­
directly, on the balance of payments. It will improve production 
techniques in the broadest sense of the word, including technologi­
cal, managerial and administrative skills, all of which have 
suffered badly during the past period of runaway inflation. While 
this may very well be the most important contribution of foreign 
investment, it is a contribution very difficult to measure 
quantitatively and the remaining sections of this paper will 
concentrate on discussing the financial and balance of payments 
implications of foreign investment policy.
Financing the Plan and the Scale of Priorities
The plan in its present form is essentially only a partial 
plan in that it does not identify macro-economic variables such 
as gross national product or capital formation. instead, output 
targets for strategic commodities in all sectors of the economy 
are set and the corresponding investment program is then matched 
against that part of domestic and foreign resources which is 
more or less amenable to government control or lends itself 
to estimation, such as foreign investment inflow, rather than 
against an estimate of aggregate and sectoral savings for the 
whole economy. As such5the plan includes both the government 
sector and a significant part of expected private investment.
This approach was considered necessary for the present as aggre­
gate data on the whole economy are lacking and the recent experi­
ence of runaway inflation has distorted basic economic relation­
ships to such an extent that presently available estimates of 
aggregate variables cannot be useful. As a result of prolonged 
inflation, capital formation as a percentage of Gross National 
Product, for instance, has dropped to very low levels. An un­
published study has estimated this ratio to vary between 6.6 and
36. Presidential Decree No, 319/1968 on the Five Year Development 
Plan, Djakarta, December 30, 1968. The Indonesian version of 
the plan, called Rentjana Pembangunan Lima Tahun 1969/70-1973/ 
7*4 (Five Year Development Plan), hereafter cited as REPELITA,~ 
was published in three volumes: Volume I, GeneralA Volume II
(in- three books), Sectoral Plans, and Volume III, The Plan 
Details by Region,(Djakarta: Government of Indonesia, December 
1568) . Note: Indonesia, beginning in 1969 , will change its
fiscal year from the calendar year to the year from April 1 
to March 31.
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9.0 per cent during the period 1960-1966.
Table 5 shows the basic financial sources of the plan and 
the sectoral distribution of plan expenditures. The plan in­
vestment figure still shows the predominance of the government 
sector but shows also the important role to be played by private 
investment5 mainly private foreign investment. The private in­
vestment target of 266 billion rupiahs, or 18.7 per cent of total 
investment, is probably too low, but, as stated earlier, it does 
not include all private investment. It is, of course, very dif­
ficult to estimate the course of private investment in the ab­
sence of reliable data on past experience and in the light of 
the major changes in economic policy and economic conditions 
which are still taking place.
The table also reflects the shift in government policy.
While total development expenditures undertaken by the state 
are quite large, it is obvious that the government intends to 
confine itself primarily to providing social services and to 
concentrating on agriculture, mainly intensification of food 
production and infrastructural development, leaving other com­
modity production sectors to private, especially private foreign 
investment. While state enterprises are expected to continue 
playing a major role, especially in the field of wholesale 
trade and communications, such enterprises are expected to be 
operated on the same basis as private enterprise and cannot 
expect the large subsidies or special credits of the past.
Under these circumstances, the success of the plan will 
depend very much not only on the total amount of private foreign 
investment the government is able to attract, but also on its 
ability to channel such investment, through fiscal and regula­
tory measures, into the desired areas indicated by the scale 
of priorities of the plan.
In the scale of priorities adopted by the plan, agriculture 
receives the major emphasis, and the development of other sec­
tors is to be geared to the requirements of agriculture. The 
plan gives secondary priority to foreign-exchange creating and 
foreign-exchange savings projects and tertiary priority to develop­
ment of the infrastructure. Thus both export-^promoting and 
import-substituting industries are to be given special stress 
in the plan.37
By comparison, the scale of priorities adopted for the new 
foreign investment policy shows in essence the following order 
of importance: export-promotion projects, import-substitution
projects and thirdly, quick-yielding projects which create 
employment or are beneficial because of their effect on improving 
production techniques.
37. REPELITA, Volume I, pp. 1-7 to 1-11.
Table 5
Financing the Five Year Plan 
(All Figures in Billions of End of 1968 Fupiahs)
Sources of Finance Sectoral Allocations of Plan Expenditures
Government £ Foreign Aid
1. Government budgetary savings 226 1. Agriculture 319
2. Counterpart funds of Foreign 2. Mining and Manufacturing 130
Program Aid 393
3. Foreign Project Aid 440 3. Electricity 100
4. Communications £ Electricity 230
5. Community Development 50
6. Social £ General Projects 230
Total 1,059 Total 1,059
Other Sources
1. Increases in intermediate 1. Agriculture 76
and long term bank credits 95
2. Reinvestment profits, 2. Mining and Manufacturing 250
foreign, domestic, and state 
enterprises investments 266
3. Communications and tourism 35
Total 361 Total 361
Grand total 1,420 Grand total 1,420
Source: REPELITA, Volume I, Chapter III. anao
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Leaving out the production of foodstuffs, which is clearly 
to receive emphasis in the government development budget, there 
remain the twin objectives of export-promoting industries and 
import-substituting industries which appear in both scales of 
priorities. The problems of which of these two should receive 
the main emphasis when attracting foreign investment is not 
easily solved. Apparently, under the "open door” policy of the 
past two years, when no specific directives were given as to 
the form of investment preferred, foreign capital has clearly 
shown a preference for investment in export-earning rather than in 
import-substituting industries.
In this field, again, the emphasis has been more on extrac­
tive industries, including mining, forestry and fisheries, than 
on exports of manufactures or the processing of raw materials.
Thus the traditional foreign investment pattern, against which, 
historically, complaints of foreign domination and colonial 
patterns of development were mainly levelled, appears still to 
be prevailing, at least in the first two years of the new 
policy.
Of course, export-promotion is a very important objective 
in economic development, and is, in the present stage of the 
economy, probably more important than import-substitution. More­
over, even if the above pattern is not ideal, it will undoubtedly 
bring concrete benefits to the economy and is certainly to be 
preferred over the course taken during the pre-1966 period, in 
which neither the government nor foreign investors were exploit­
ing the forests and mineral resources through endless indecision 
and verbal semantics on the merits and demerits of passing a 
foreign investment law, resulting in such natural resources 
remaining untapped for over twenty years.
The emergence of the "traditional pattern of investment" 
stems directly from the foreign investment act itself which in 
many respects is even more liberal than that of Indonesia’s 
closest neighbors. In the 1956 Pioneer Industries Act of 
Malaysia, for instance, only manufacturing industries can 
qualify for "pioneer" status. This act was replaced by a new 
Investment Incentive Act in 1968,in which the definition was 
broadened to include any kind of commercial undertaking, al­
though industries processing commodities for export are still 
favored. The Philippines Investment Incentives Act, promulgated 
in 1967 (Republic Act 5186), was also accompanied by an Invest­
ment Priority Plan in which industries to be granted preferred 
or preferred pioneer status, including total capacities of 
production, were specified. Import-substitution in the Philippines 
had,of course,received special protection during the period 
before decontrol in 1962. By contrast, the Indonesian act 
stipulates that all foreign enterprises approved in 1967-1968 
are granted pioneer status, qualifying for additional tax 
exemption privileges.
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It is understandable that foreign enterprises in minerals 
and extractive industries are easier to attract than those in 
manufacturing. 'Nevertheless, the general trend among develop­
ing countries in attracting foreign investment at present is 
directed towards diversifying their largely raw materials 
based economies by the domestic processing of raw materials, 
the introduction of import-substituting and export-creating 
manufacturing industries as well as through the development of 
tourism.
If Indonesia appears to be an exception to this general 
trend, it is because the past two years saw a preoccupation 
of the government with measures to combat inflation and to stem 
the downward drift of exports and consequent balance of pay­
ments difficulties. With the background of expropriation with­
out compensation and the generally hostile attitude towards foreign 
capital in the pre-1966 era still fresh in everyone’s mind, a 
too restrictive foreign investment law would probably have had 
no success at all in attracting foreign capital. Now that the 
stabilization program has shown indications of success, there 
is no reason why the promotional campaign should not be directed 
towards attracting more import-substituting industries together 
with the objective of export-promotion.
Development of industrial estates and the undertaking of 
pre-investment surveys by the government for specific industries 
will encourage potential investors. The Department of Basic and 
Light Industries and Power has published a list of 94 projects 
in various manufacturing sectors declared "open" to foreign 
investors.38 Many of these projects were originally envisaged 
as state projects and some of them, such as the Tjilegon Steel 
Plant, are now substantially completed with predominantly 
Eastern European aid, which has in most cases been terminated.
This list may form the basis of an investment-priority plan in 
manufacturing and may be expanded to include preinvestment data 
on the likely development of markets, the degree of protection 
from foreign competition and other pertinent information.
In order to encourage foreign investment in manufacturing, 
joint ventures in this field will only mean that at least ten 
per cent of the capital should be Indonesian if the partner is a 
private company. In case the joint venture is undertaken with 
a state enterprise, the equity ratio becomes 50:50.
Protection from foreign competition is, of course, one of 
the major policy devices in promoting import-substituting in­
dustries. Domestic industries suffered heavily when foreign
38. Department of Basic and Light Industries and Power, Policy 
on Foreign Capital Investment in the Field of Basic, Light 
Industries and Power (Djakarta, 1968).
62
exchange regulations were drastically liberalized in October 
1966, and imports of consumer goods poured in as the multiple 
exchange rates prevailing up till then were virtually abolished. 
Protection in the form of higher tariffs and favorable pre­
payment conditions for raw materials and capital goods imports 
were only gradually re-introduced in 1968. This is reflected 
in the composition of consumer-goods imports which will be 
analyzed later.
Balance of Payments Implications
The policy of the pre-1966 era in accepting credits while 
objecting to equity foreign investment has resulted, among others, 
in a huge external debt, amounting to $2.2 billion on June 30,
1968. A major part of this debt was contracted on unfavorable 
terms and was earmarked for military undertakings with negative 
or low economic productivity. While the government successfully 
rescheduled external debts falling due both in 1967 and 1968, 
and is expected to be able to achieve the same in 1969, this 
action will increase the already heavy debt service payments 
falling due after 1970. Average debt repayment throughout the 
1970Ts is estimated to be in the order of 22-23 per cent of 
foreign exchange earnings.39
The impact of foreign direct investment on the balance of 
payments cannot be easily assessed. Trying to measure the rela­
tive benefits from such investments as compared to those derived 
from foreign credits is even more complicated. The balance of 
payments effect of private direct investment includes the foreign 
exchange earnings or savings resulting from the project itself. 
This is frequently not the case in foreign loan projects because 
of the long gestation periods of infrastructural projects for 
which such aid is generally given.
In the case of balance of payments program aid, which in 
Indonesia is sold on the so-called Bonus Export market to gen­
eral importers for a wide range of essential goods including 
certain consumer goods, debt-servicing will have to come from 
other foreign exchange creating sectors. On the other hand, 
the direct effect of foreign investment inflow on alleviating 
balance of payments problems arising out of trade deficits is 
quite limited, as the initial foreign exchange inflow is chiefly 
used to import such things as machinery, drilling equipment, 
etc. A larger inflow than necessary, which may be deliberately 
contracted by the investor who is at the same time the supplier
39. REPELITA, Vol. I, p. III-22. This assumes new loans to be 
predominantly contracted on D.A.C. terms of 20 years matur­
ity, 7 years grace period and 3% interest.
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of equipment, will have an adverse effect on the future balance 
of payments because of excessive outflow to service such in­
vestment .
In the present Indonesian investment policy, no guidelines 
as yet exist to estimate the net foreign exchange gains or 
sayings from a specific capital inflow in order to determine the 
eligibility of the project to qualify for exemptions under the 
law. Moreover, the law states that no restrictions will be 
placed on the remittance of profits. The only way to encourage 
the reinvestment of profits will therefore have to be through 
fiscal measures. In projects where the foreign exchange benefit 
to the country is not clear, such as in "import-intensive" import- 
substitution projects (assembly plants or "packaging" industries), 
an unlimited transfer of profits will result in a continuous 
strain on the balance of payments.
Table 6 presents the summary of balance of payments projec­
tions for the five year plan period. It shows that private capital 
is expected to come in at an accelerating rate, reaching $171 
million dollars by 1973/74, or three times the inflow expected 
in 1969-70. Judging from the present rate of approvals of applica­
tions for investment, the total of $571 million expected over the 
five year period is probably not too excessive a target, although 
permits to invest, as indicated earlier, should not be confused 
with actual investments.
Private capital inflow estimates presumably incorporate 
expected changes in external reserves. They also include an 
expected back-flow of private "domestic" capital which had been 
kept abroad during previous unsettled times and of proceeds 
from technical smuggling originating from "overprice" proceeds,40 
as well as from outright smuggling.
As shown in Table 6, the government will not solely 
rely on private capital investment but will still depend heavily 
on foreign aid throughout the plan period. For 1968, commodity 
or program aid requested by Indonesia amounted to $250 million, 
while project loans requested total $75 million. Actual program 
aid received, including PL 480 aid, was $254 million, while addi­
tional food aid of $58 million was delivered. Thus total non­
project aid amounted to $304 million. Taking account of the 
amount carried over from 1967 of $26 million and an estimated 
carryover into 1969 of $32 million, actual utilization of program 
aid for 1968 is about $298 million, contributing substantially
40. Overprice proceeds is the foreign exchange revenue accruing 
to exporters resulting from the difference between prices 
actually obtained in foreign markets and the "checkprices" 
deliberately set below world prices on which export 
taxes and official foreign exchange earnings are calculated. 
This system has been in use for many years to provide added 
incentive to encourage exports.
Table 6 <D-P
Summary of Balance of Payments Projections 1969/70 - 1973/74
(in millions U.S. $)
1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74
1. Exports (f.o.b.)a 672 775 784 827 924
2. Imports (f.o.b.)a -876 -1,058 -1,194 -1,310 -1,438
3. Servicesa -19 7 -237 -281 -320 -362
Current Account Balance -401 -520 -691 -803 -876
Capital Account A^
1. Debt repayment8- -58 -179 -203 -202 -205
2. Capital inflow required 459 699 894 1,005 1,081
a) Government 402 613 780 862 910
b) Private 57 86 114 143 171
Capital Account B^
CL1. Debt repayment -5 8 — — — —
2. Capital inflow required 459 520 691 803 876
a) Government 402 434 577 660 705
b) Private 57 86 114 143 171
Source: REPELITA, Vol. I, Chapter III.
a. Exports include "net" oil exports, i.e., oil exports minus cost of production and other 
costs, and investment income accruing to foreign oil companies. It also excludes 
foreign exchange costs of domestic marketing and debt payments to expropriated Shell 
Company. The imports, services and debt repayment accounts are therefore net of oil 
payments.
b. Capital Account A assumes foreign debts falling due without rescheduling. Capital 
Account B assumes such debts to be rescheduled fully. (See text for explanation)
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to the stability of rice and other prices throughout the year.
The contribution of foreign direct investment on export 
earnings will be more important than the inflow of the capital 
itself. As described earlier, the prospects for increasing ex­
port earnings from petroleum, forestry, fisheries and other rela­
tively new exports such as copper, nickel and bauxite are very 
good and the annual compound rate of growth of exports of 6.6 
per cent suggested by Table 6 may even prove to be on the low 
side. Of course, a continuing decline in rubber and tin prices 
in world markets would lower overall export rates of growth, 
except if offset by really spectacular rates of growth in new 
exports which benefit from expanding demand trends in world 
trade.
The above is reflected in the plan, as rates of growth 
projected for different categories of exports vary widely. Dur­
ing the plan period, category A exports, or traditional exports, 
including rubber, tin-in-concentrates, copra, palm-oil, coffee 
and tobacco leaves and manufactured tobacco, is expected to grow 
at an annual rate of only 3.*+ per cent, reaching 5503 million 
bv 1973/74. The rate of growth for category B exports, on the 
other "hand, which include all other exports except oil, is 
expected to be 14.9 per cent annually, while petroleum exports 
are expected to grow by 10 ."4 per cent annually.
Imports are expected to grow very rapidly also, but their 
composition is expected to change significantly. In 1969/70, 
food imports will take up 19.3 per cent of imports, raw materials 
and intermediate goods 31.5 per cent, capital goods 27.8 per 
cent and other consumer goods 21.3 per cent. The 1973/74 pro­
portions are estimated to be: food imports 4.6 per cent, raw
materials 44.1 per cent, capital goods 38.7 per cent and other 
consumer goods 12.5 per cent.
The rapid growth of imports, estimated at an annual com­
pounded average rate of 12.1 per cent will outpace the rate of 
growth of exports. This will result in a persistent current 
account deficit in the balance of payments. It should be noted 
that Indonesia1s balance of payments between 1961 and 1966 also 
experienced a persistent deficit in the current account, but it 
is hoped that the balance of payments developments in the crucial 
years of the five year plan will be accompanied by an acceleration 
in the rate of economic growth which is the ultimate objective 
of development policy.
Foreign investment is expected to contribute substantially 
to the acceleration in the expected rate of growth. However, 
if sustained high rates of growth in the long run are envisaged, 
foreign investment should be directed more towards manufacturing, 
whether it is of the import-substituting or of the export­
processing variety. In order to foster foreign investment in 
these sectors, specific incentives should be provided. Moreover,
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exchange regulations and administrative bureaucracy should be 
simplified, while corporation laws and tax rates should be 
changed to favor such fields of endeavor. In addition, tne 
Technical Committee on Foreign Capital Investment should be 
given more power and should become a genuine Board of Invest­
ment empowered to approve investment applications in the field 
of manufacturing and services, without having to deal with the 
departments concerned. It is understandable that in mining and 
forestry, the departments concerned should have a hand in giving 
approval to particular foreign investors as this concerns 
the wealth of the country, but such procedures applied to 
manufacturing and services serve little purpose and are 
reminiscent of the past, when as many departments as possible 
were involved in imposing controls and restrictions on private 
enterprise.
